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SECTION VII-MECHANICAL TRANSPORT
It may be said in general that mechanical transport is provided by the Master-General of the Ordnance and that "the movement of troops, animals and stores by sea, land and air" belongs to the functions of the Quarter-Master- General. The Controller of Transport is a civilian, an officer of the Department of Transport, first appointed on November 16, 1939. More extended reference will be made to his duties later.
The cable of the 9th October asked National Defence Headquarters whether all or part of the Canadian force would be ready to embark on a vessel called the Awatea, which could sail from Vancouver between October 20th and the end of that month. The cable stated another opportunity for direct sailing was unlikely to occur within two months and observed upon the importance of taking advantage of the Awatea, if at all possible. It was suggested that the battalions should be on the higher establishment for infantry battalions, but with possibly a reduce scale of transport vehicles, but that the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong was being asked for suggestions as to both the scale of equipment and transport, including carriers, which should be pro- vided. It was also stated that Canadian Military Headquarters in London must be advised by October 15th whether or not arrangements could be com- pleted in Canada in time for the sailing of the Awatea.
At the meeting of the Directors held the same day, namely, October 9th at 3.00 p.m., it was settled that the expedition should be made ready to sail October 27th. This was dictated by the fact that there were other troop move- ments which had to be made between the dates already mentioned (October 20 to 31) and rolling stock was not available to enable all these movements to proceed concurrently. It was also decided that preparation should be made to send first reinforcements with the troops, and that, pending further word from London in regard to transport, full scale transport, boxed, should be provided. Captain (later Major) James, of the Directorate of Mechanization in the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance, undertook to proceed with arrangements to provide the transport. This transport, amounting to 212 vehicles in all, consisted of the following:-
45 motorcycles
6 light Ford cars
57 Universal carriers
63 fifteen-cwt. trucks
2 fifteen-cwt. water tanks 39 three-ton trucks
On October 11, Canadian Military Headquarters in London cabled details of the equipment and transport to be provided. The cable asked that, in order to effect economy in time and shipping, as much as possible of the weapons, transport and ammunition should be taken with the troops.
Only two water tanks of the desired type were obtainable in Canada at this time and arrangements were made to substitute 15-cwt. for 8-cwt. trucks. A further meeting of the Directors concerned with the preparations was held on October 14, at which it was reported by Major James that he had made arrangements for the 212 vehicles. At this meeting it was arranged that the various Directors in the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance should co-ordinate their work with the officer in the Quartermaster-General's Branch in charge of movement of troops and supplies (Colonel Spearing), as well as with the officer in charge of administration of the force itself (Colonel Hennessy).
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It may be stated at once that, although this information was not available at that time, the Awatea did not have the capacity to take the necessary ships' stores, the troops, their baggage, weapons, ammunition and equipment, as well the mechanical transport. Whether or not the British authorities were are of this is not perfectly clear, but there is reason to think that they so surmised, as the cable of October 11, as already pointed out, requested that as much of above weapons, transport, ammunition to be taken with units ". I assume this means as much as was possible, having regard to the capacity of the ship.
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The Awatea was built as a passenger vessel, designed to carry some five hundred passengers. She had undergone refitting to enable her to carry some 2,000 troops. After the ship had taken on her stores, the weapons, equip- ment, ammunition and the troops' baggage, there remained from 10,000 to 12,000 cubic feet only. The mechanical transport alone amounted to about fifty car- loads requiring some 125,000 cubic feet. The total cargo space of the Awatea was only 45,000 cubic feet.
No other vessel was available, nor became available until later in October, namely, October 28, when a freighter of American registry, the Don Jose, reached Vancouver and space was obtained for the vehicles in her. If the expedition was to sail on the Awatea as planned, the importance of which was stressed by the War Office on October 9, the great bulk of this mechanical trans- port had to be left behind, and, as was known to the War Office and stated in the cable of October 9, an opportunity for it to go forward was unlikely.
On or about October 21, the probability of the second vessel becoming available emerged and, in fact, all the vehicles with the exception of one carload of spare parts, which was not despatched from Oshawa until October 28, were loaded upon this second vessel, which sailed from Vancouver on November 4.
This vessel had other cargo to load, but space was obtained in her. To do so her agents were induced to shut out some 75,000 feet of lumber which she had arranged to carry to Hong Kong. The Don Jose was originally routed for Shanghai, Hong Kong and Manila in that order, but, due to instructions received by the Master on November 1 from United States Naval authorities, the ship proceeded first to Honolulu and from thence to Manila, where she arrived December 12 and where, war having broken out, arrangements were made to turn over to the American Army in the Philippines the vehicles which she carried. Had it not been for this deviation, under instructions from superior authority, the Don Jose would, under normal conditions, have reached Hong Kong about December 6. Her normal speed was from 11 to 12 knots and on the voyage from Vancouver to Honolulu she actually averaged 10 knots. This miscarriage was, of course, not in any sense due to the fault of any Canadian official concerned with the shipping of these vehicles.
As already mentioned, there was some free space of from 10,000 cubic feet to 12,000 cubic feet in the Awatea when she sailed and the question which has been much agitated is why she sailed without taking some of these vehicles. It has already been pointed out that at the meeting of Directors of October 14, Major James reported that provision had been made for the full 212 vehicles. He had in fact arranged with the manufacturers concerned for the boxing and loading by them of this equipment on the railway cars between October 13 and 16. The reason that these shipments did not proceed to Vancouver in accordance with these arrangements was that the shipment was stopped by the Controller of Transport on October 15, because he was aware that the Awatea had not the capacity for this cargo and no other vessel was known at that time to be available at Vancouver, either then or in the near future. The Controller, in view of the fact that the vehicles might have to be shipped from an American port and routed over American railway lines, in
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